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Abstract. The article explores the effects increasing automation has on our conceptions of hu-
man agency. We conceptualize the central features of human agency as ableness, intentionality, 
and rationality and define responsibility as a central feature of moral agency. We discuss sugges-
tions in favor of holding AI systems moral agents for their functions but join those who refute 
this view. We consider the possibility of assigning moral agency to automated AI systems in 
settings of machine-human cooperation but come to the conclusion that AI systems are not gen-
uine participants in joint action and cannot be held morally responsible. Philosophical issues 
notwithstanding, the functions of AI systems change human agency as they affect our goal setting 
and pursuing by influencing our conceptions of the attainable. Recommendation algorithms on 
news sites, social media platforms, and in search engines modify our possibilities to receive ac-
curate and comprehensive information, hence influencing our decision making. Sophisticated AI 
systems replace human workforce even in such demanding fields as medical surgery, language 
translation, visual arts, and composing music. Being second to a machine in an increasing number 
of fields of expertise will affect how human beings regard their own abilities. We need a deeper 
understanding of how technological progress takes place and how it is intertwined with economic 
and political realities. Moral responsibility remains a human characteristic. It is our duty to de-
velop AI to serve morally good ends and purposes. Protecting and strengthening the conditions 
of human agency in any AI environment is part of this task. 
Keywords: Moral Agency, AI-systems, Human-computer Interaction. 
1 Introduction 
Human dignity and moral responsibility are the two moral features central to our view 
of humanity. Respect for human dignity also forms one of the cornerstones of moral 
action. In Immanuel Kant’s words, human beings must never be treated as means only 
but always also as ends in themselves [10]. The basic assumption that human beings 
are morally responsible for their deeds makes them legally accountable. Within socie-
ties in which human rights form the core of the legal thinking, historical developments 
tend to be inspired by these fundamental values.  
An ever-widening variety of artificial intelligence (AI) systems plays a central role 
in our professional, economic, and social activities. There are high hopes that, in the 
near future, autonomous and adaptive robots and AI systems will take over a diverse 
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set of demanding or dangerous tasks. Complex webs of human–machine cooperation 
emerge as AI systems continuously collect information from their users and apply it as 
material for their learning algorithms, resulting in changes in their functioning in rela-
tion to their tasks and users.  
Acting in interaction with an AI-modified environment may change the basic condi-
tions of human agency and, therefore, affect the conditions of maintaining the intrinsic 
value of human dignity. In the following study, we explore how we can conceptualize 
the changes in human agency that a life closely tied to and connected with different 
types of AI are likely to bring forth.  
2 Technologies are Designed for Instrumental Uses  
Artifacts and technologies are designed for instrumental uses; as such, we evaluate their 
goodness—that is, their suitability, usefulness, and efficiency—in terms of the func-
tions they were designed to serve [31] [32]. If a tool is useless in its instrumental task, 
we may scrupulously replace it with something better. It is not morally blameworthy to 
treat artifacts and technological systems simply and solely as a means to an end; as 
such, should an artifact or technology be ill suited for its use, we need not feel guilty 
for abandoning them and replacing them with something better. We may lament the 
lost time and resources, but as consumer legislation indicates, the objects of blame are 
the designers or manufacturers of the artifacts rather than the artifacts themselves. If 
there is any harm involved in the use of an artifact, we seek human actors on which to 
place the blame. 
Currently, we are experiencing another period of hype related to the development of 
AI and its applications. National governments and multinational organizations antici-
pate that AI will not only save the economy but also provide solutions to all sorts of 
problems, ranging from the climate change crisis to elderly care. These expectations 
seem to rely on assigning a large role to AI systems in an increasing number of fields 
of human activity. [6] [16]  
Autonomous and adaptive robots and AI systems are likely to take over a growing 
variety of tasks that are hazardous to human actors or so complicated that their perfor-
mance involves a high probability of failure. [15] Rescue robots, for example, can ac-
complish life-saving actions that are too risky for human rescue workers; similarly, 
surgical robots can carry out an increasing number of different types of operations that 
require precision or durability that surpass human capacity. Most complicated calcula-
tions, data collection, and data management operations are already run by AI systems 
and would be impossible to perform without them. Energy, lighting, and water supply, 
maintenance, and delivery are also already run by AI-regulated systems. [16] The de-
velopment of machine learning will multiply the number of fields that are based on AI-
run procedures. 
While AI helps to effectuate a vast number of human activities, it also renders human 
communities and societies extremely dependent on AI systems and their smooth func-
tioning. Unlike mechanical machines, AI systems are not straightforward in their run-
ning, and the cause of their possible failure may be difficult to detect and both time-
3 
consuming and expensive to fix. The probability of responsibility gaps—that is, situa-
tions in which it becomes impossible to assign moral responsibility for perilous out-
comes on any specific agent—also increases with the broader use of AI systems [7]. 
The view of an AI-regulated world that humans are unable to control and direct may 
not be just a remote dystopia. 
Agency is a basic human good and closely related to the conception of dignity [9] 
[25] [31] [32]. Acting in interaction with an AI-modified environment may change the 
basic conditions of human action and, therefore, the intrinsic value of human dignity. 
How can we conceptualize the changes in human agency and protect the terms of hu-
man dignity? The unpredictable nature of cooperation in the AI environment involves 
the danger that the categories of instrumental and technical goodness [31] will overrule 
intrinsic moral values. 
Previous moral philosophical [9] and psychological research [19] [14] shows that 
three features characterize human agency: ableness, intentionality, and rationality. In 
the following section, we use these three concepts to analyze human–AI cooperation in 
order to detect and explore the possible impacts of AI systems on human agency and 
their effects on conceptualizations of human dignity. 
3 Agency and Moral Agency 
3.1 Conditions of Agency 
For decades, academics have studied how human–computer interaction situations—in-
volving, particularly, the sense of control humans have over actions and their conse-
quences—may change the way in which we conceptualize human agency [14] [19] [2]. 
Although the discussion has been in many ways insightful, the results of these studies 
cannot be straightforwardly applied to human interaction with AI systems, and even 
less so to AI with designed learning capacities. 
Traditionally, human–computer interaction has been understood as a form of bilat-
eral communication. The problem with this approach is that it disregards the features 
in the relationship that give rise to conceptualizing it as a cooperative situation between 
a single actor or a group of human agents and an AI system. From the perspective of 
users, AI systems appear to be environments in which they cannot foresee what will 
take place or how to control the environment. The unpredictable nature of moves and 
countermoves is accentuated in systems where human and machine partners form a 
cooperative collective [18]. As AI systems and their functioning become more complex 
with interactive elements and learning capacities, the number of problematic issues re-
lated to human–computer interaction grows.  
Human beings tend to personify their environment; boats are given names, and en-
gines are cursed at for not working properly. It is then no wonder that we attach per-
sonified characteristics to complex AI systems. [22] [1] Does our proneness to anthro-
pomorphize the world in which we act mislead us, to give artifacts and technology roles 
and positions that will eventually make us less human? To better grasp the issue at hand, 
let us first discuss the conditions for calling a performing capacity “agency.” 
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Aviation safety has improved immensely in virtue of various detection technologies 
and autonomous steering systems [4]. As these findings are translated into applications 
in the development of mass-manufactured motor vehicles, the role of human drivers is 
gradually decreasing. A fleet of self-driving cars in everyday use is no longer science 
fiction but an integral part of the prospect of improved road safety [15]. For a human 
being, such vehicles seem to make decisions and act upon them; as such, the question 
arises of whether we should view a self-driving car as an agent. 
Historically, the concept of agency has been tightly tied to human beings and their 
capacities. There is, however, no consensus about the necessary or sufficient features 
defining the concept. It is safe to say that, in humans, agency is not a binary property 
but that its emergence takes place gradually during the physical, social, and psycholog-
ical development of a child.  
Even newborns, whose needs are provided for by parents and other caregivers, start 
to notice that what they do has an impact on those around them; for example, crying 
will usually summon someone to come to check on them, while gurgling or smiling 
will make the caregiver coo and caress them. Little by little, babies learn how to control 
their movements and the sounds they utter in a way that will enable them to make cer-
tain things happen. [24] 
The same aspects that are crucial in child development reflect two features that are 
central to the conception of agency. An agent must be able to do things that will, in 
some way, change how things are in the world. Part of these functions relates to oneself 
(e.g., babies learn how to put their thumb in their mouth), but more importantly, these 
functions can influence the outside world. Being able to affect reality is a necessary 
condition for agency [9]. Let us call this the “ableness condition” (for examples of the 
use of this term, see Morriss 2002, 80–86) [20].  
The second feature related to the notion of agency that is already visible in early 
childhood is the purposefulness of activities [24]. Our needs must be satisfied; one’s 
wants and wishes indicate that there is a will to change how things are in reality. Even 
a rudimentary sense of oneself and a vague understanding of one’s abilities form a basis 
for intentionality. An act is based on a goal that an actor pursues, using their activity as 
a means by which to reach it. Achieving almost any goal necessitates performing a 
series of acts that, together, form the action for pursuing or realizing an end. For an 
activity to be a manifestation of agency, the “intentionality condition” states that the 
activity must be a means designed for achieving the desired end.[9] [18] 
Intentionality connects the aim and the action for achieving it, but this connection 
cannot be arbitrary. If there is no real possibility of reaching the goal or making its 
realization more probable, the activity is useless for furthering one’s chosen end. To tie 
the goal to the action, agents must therefore be rational, in the minimal sense that they 
can discern fanciful ideas from realizable plans and have an idea of at least some of the 
actions that they are able to carry out. Let us call this requirement the “rationality con-
dition.” [9] [18] 
Intentionality connects the aim and the action for achieving it, but this connection 
cannot be arbitrary. If there is no real possibility of reaching the goal or making its 
realization more probable, the activity is useless for furthering one’s chosen end. To tie 
the goal to the action, agents must therefore be rational, in the minimal sense that they 
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can discern fanciful ideas from realizable plans and have an idea of at least some of the 
actions that they are able to carry out. Let us call this requirement the “rationality con-
dition.” [9] [24] [29 
 
3.2 Features of Moral Agency 
After having sketched central conditions of agency, let us consider the features of moral 
agency. As a starting point, we can use Thomas Aquinas’s first principle of practical 
reason, a guiding norm of action (i.e., morality): “Bonum est faciendum et prosequen-
dum et malum vitandum,” meaning, “Good must be done and pursued and evil avoided” 
(Summa Theologiae I-II, 94:2) [27]. 
The main features central to moral agency serve as the presuppositions for the first 
principle of practical reason, as it is not possible to follow the norm without them. First, 
the principle expresses a positive and a negative norm. The positive norm exhorts the 
agent to do certain types of deeds and pursue certain types of ends; the negative norm 
tells the agent to avoid certain types of deeds and, implicitly, certain types of ends. The 
negative norm could also be expressed in a more categorical way by forbidding the 
agent to carrying out certain types of deeds and pursuing certain types of ends.  
Second, morality presupposes that agents pay attention to discerning the types of 
actions they are supposed to do—that is, discerning good actions from those they must 
avoid doing, and good ends worth pursuing from those that are evil or bad. Third, agents 
must commit themselves to following both the positive and the negative norm in their 
acting as they choose the goals and means of their actions. It is the willingness to do so 
and to commit oneself to following the first principle of practical reason that makes an 
agent moral. 
What Thomas Aquinas’s definition does not express is the social nature of morality. 
An implicit presupposition in morality is that humans naturally aim at their (subjec-
tively supposed) good and do not need any specific norm to motivate them to do so. 
What makes ends and deeds morally good or evil is their effect on other people and 
their wellbeing [25]. An important part of the social aspect of morality is that moral 
agents can be blamed and praised for what they do and what their actions cause. The 
social practices of blaming and praising indicate that the agents are being held respon-
sible for what they do and cause by their deeds.  
The central features of moral agency tie actors together into a community of other 
moral actors in which they are bound to each other, forming an intertwining web of 
relationships in virtue of the effects of their actions on each other and everyone [9]. 
Communities form and dissolve for various reasons; in between, they exist for some 
purpose that ties the members to each other and to the community [29]. Acting based 
on this purpose and being mutually connected create communication and meaning—a 
group culture that takes place in time, forming a common history for the members. In 
this way, belonging to and being part of any community is historically constituted. [8] 
“Moral responsibility” is acknowledging one’s role in the moral community and 
committing oneself to doing one’s share as a part of the whole. Being morally respon-
sible involves moral agents identifying themselves as givers and receivers of various 
goods within a network of mutual interdependency. To adopt the role and viewpoint of 
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a moral agent implies that one is willing to widen one’s individual perspective and 
consider things from a universalizable moral point of view. 
To sum up the central features of moral agency, we can say that moral agents (are 
willing and challenge themselves to) discern what is good from what is evil, and they 
commit themselves to doing and pursuing good and avoiding evil. In doing so, they 
commit themselves to extending their consideration not just to themselves but also to 
others. They identify themselves as members of a socially and historically constituted 
moral community within which they take and bear responsibility for their actions and 
the consequences of their actions. In which sense, then, can we speak of AI as having 
features of moral agency? Can human–AI interaction change the features of moral 
agency in humans? 
 
3.3 Do AI-systems Count as Moral Agents?  
The development of AI systems has made the boundaries between instrumental tech-
nologies and human agents opaque. Human agents tend to interact more efficiently with 
AI systems when they perceive them to be humanlike entities. Social robots and bots 
developed for social contexts resemble human actors both in their functions and in their 
given identities: designers give names to technologies operated by social AI and share 
narratives of their history. Learning machines develop their own functioning. This de-
velopment has led to claims that we should attribute agency to complex self-learning 
AI systems and assign at least partial responsibility to AI agents functioning in interac-
tion with human agents. [8] [5] [1] 
Hakli and Mäkelä (2019) present a multifaceted argument against the view that AI 
systems are moral agents that can be held responsible for their actions. They introduce 
various arguments in the current discussion on the subject but maintain that not even 
future developments of the technology could furnish AI systems with the conditions 
necessary for moral agency. Their ground for arguing against extending moral respon-
sibility—a feature central to moral agency—to AI systems and robots is that they 
lack—and will always lack, no matter how intricate their technology—autonomy and 
reflective self-control. [8] 
Such a view is based on Alfred R. Mele’s (1995) [17] contention that both autonomy 
and responsibility are features that gradually develop during the lived history of an 
agent. It is not just the intentional attitudes, values (i.e., the view of certain behaviors 
as intrinsically good, or “pro-attitudes”) and capacities of an agent that matter but the 
causal history through which they were formed. In contrast, every AI system and robot, 
those with in-built learning capacities included, are initially brought into existence—or 
produced—by someone who programmed them. It then follows that the values and 
preferences displayed as the pro-attitudes that direct or determine the goals of an AI 
system or a robot can be traced back to the initial engineering design of the system. 
From a moral point of view, engineering counts as manipulation that undermines moral 
autonomy. Even when AI systems display pro-attitudes that direct their functioning 
and, in this sense, simulate goal-oriented agents, their intentionality is not authentic for 
the reason of its origin as a programmed propensity. As such, AI systems cannot be 
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held responsible for the outcomes of their functions and therefore cannot count as moral 
agents either. [8] 
What Hakli and Mäkelä’s conclusion implies in terms of moral agency and human 
responsibility is that the complexity and self-learning features of machines and artifacts 
do have an impact on responsibility assessment, opening such considerations to respon-
sibility gaps and making it harder to determine where both praise and blame lie. The 
way forward, then, is not to attribute moral responsibility to AI systems but to assess 
anew the nature and boundaries of human moral agency. 
 
3.4 Is Human-AI Interaction Collective Action? 
Another approach to considering whether AI systems can be held morally accountable 
is to examine human–AI interaction. An important part of human agency takes place in 
the context of multiple agents. A strong theme in an ongoing discussion concerns 
whether human interaction with AI systems counts as collective action involving shared 
or joint intentional states or cooperation. [18] [266]  
Whatever stance we take to the matter, AI systems and their various applications 
form a growing number of complex webs of human–machine systems: the AI systems 
continuously collect information about their users and apply it as material for their 
learning algorithms that again change their functioning in relation to the users, and so 
on.  
It is hoped that AI-assisted data analysis will not only help in achieving goals set by 
human users of AI systems but that the systems themselves will pave the way for new 
findings, such as in medical diagnostics and the prevention of social issues [3]. Differ-
ent types of data records could be used to improve both health and social wellbeing on 
a national, and even global, level. Not all researchers are equally enthusiastic about 
such prospects. Some claim that this new type of technology (i.e., AI systems) neces-
sarily changes our view of humanity and morality and, therefore, also changes our con-
ceptual terms of human action [23] 30. 
Hakli and Mäkelä [8] consider whether human–machine interaction could be viewed 
as joint or collective action, as they discuss the possibility of holding AI agents at least 
partially responsible for the outcomes and consequences of their workings. According 
to their argument, the causal history of an AI system makes it implausible to regard the 
system as a moral agent capable of moral responsibility. They refute Latours’s (2005) 
[12] view that collective agents, some of which are human beings and some artifacts, 
could be ascribed partial responsibility.  
Hakli and Mäkelä back up their claim by referring to the philosophy of social action. 
Here, the definition of “joint action” reads as follows: two or more individuals perform 
a joint action if each of them intentionally performs an individual action but does so 
with the (true) belief that in performing the action, they will jointly realize an end that 
each of them has. The definition ascribes joint responsibility to the individuals partak-
ing in the action. The notion of joint action implies that every group member is indi-
vidually morally responsible for the joint action and its outcomes but also individually 
responsible, jointly and interdependently with the other members of the group. [8] [29] 
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As AI systems cannot be held morally responsible agents, they also do not fulfill the 
conditions of joint responsibility.  
Could programming AI systems to perform morally favorable preferences serve as 
a counter claim to the negative view concerning responsibility and moral agency in AI 
systems? Let us consider a simple example. There are AI-monitored systems for as-
signing doctor appointments to patients. Such a system’s designers can program the 
system to discern the patients whose need for medical examination or care is urgent 
from those whose condition allows for a longer waiting time before the appointment. It 
is possible to include different types of parameters in the preference algorithm, such as 
the patients’ age, social status, and indicators concerning vulnerability, to increase the 
moral sensitivity of the algorithmic principles concerning the administration of consul-
tation times.  
Adding such features into the algorithm would improve the monitoring of appoint-
ments in medical care in terms of fairness—which is a moral characteristic—but it 
would not make the AI system morally responsible for placing the patients in a prefer-
ential order. Those who feel they have unjustly been left waiting in the patient queue 
would, rightly, blame those who designed the code for the monitoring system rather 
than the AI application itself.  
From the viewpoint of an AI system, the programming that produces the morally 
favorable features is in no way different from any other piece of code in its algorithm. 
It would be justified to call such an appointment monitoring application a well-func-
tioning AI system, but it would not make the system a moral agent. 
So far, there are no convincing arguments for assigning moral agency or responsi-
bility to AI systems or robots, and if Hakli and Mäkelä are correct, there are conceptual 
reasons that prevent us from doing so notwithstanding any future developments in AI. 
For this reason, human–AI interaction is not genuinely or fully collective action.  
4 Moral Agency within Human-AI System Interaction 
Let us now scrutinize how acting within an AI system or AI-monitored scheme may 
affect the notion of human agency by relying on the three characteristics of agency 
featured in section 2 (i.e., the ableness condition, the intentionality condition, and the 
rationality condition). 
Technology is always designed to serve some purpose; it is therefore never value 
neutral. The ends that artifacts are supposed to fulfill or further become visible through 
their uses and hoped-for effects. Technology plays a causal, not an intrinsic, role even 
in interactive settings between humans and AI systems. [8] 
As part of technology, AI is designed to assist human beings in their various enter-
prises. Machines are there to do the work that is too hard—in any sense of the word—
for people. During the era of industrialization, motorized engines have replaced human 
labor in a growing number of tasks. Machines take care of chores that involve the use 
of physical power or repetitive actions. When machines take over human tasks, at each 
phase of the process, there are people who lose their jobs and positions. In the beginning 
of the process of industrialization, the development of technology replaced those doing 
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manual labor. However, during recent decades, AI systems have begun to replace the 
skilled human workforce; in the coming years, an increasing number of professions are 
likely to become futile. 
So far, machines have not become superior to human labor in terms of its most val-
ued human features, and it has been consoling to think that human beings still take care 
of the highest functions of any activity and that machines only perform auxiliary tasks. 
The development of autonomous and self-leaning AI systems changes this. For exam-
ple, the improvement of aviation safety now strongly relies on lessening the impact of 
human perception and decision making in managing an aircraft [11]. The same devel-
opment is already in progress for sea and land traffic [13] [16]. The latest findings show 
that AI-based screening programs are able to detect tumors that doctors do not notice 
[3].  
There is no prospect any time soon of a limit to the things that AI systems can do 
better than human agents. So, at what point does widening the range of technology 
become a form of paternalism that inhibits people from performing tasks for the sake 
of protecting their own interest? It is likely that being second to a machine in an in-
creasing number of fields of expertise will affect how human beings regard their own 
abilities, and the use of self-learning AI will accelerate this process. The more human 
beings—who get ill and grow old, err and fail—can be replaced by robots and AI sys-
tems, the more they will look like a source of unnecessary cost. 
Even artists may notice that robots can take over their jobs. Musical robots can be 
programmed to have a touch for any genre of music; from a large set of data about 
popular hits, they can produce an endless variety of new ones. [22] There is no charac-
teristic as such that could be called “creativity” that would help to discern a human-
composed piece from one produced by AI [28]. Linguistic programs are already versa-
tile enough to complete many tasks, and the speed with which translation machines 
have improved predicts that, someday, AI systems will master linguistic skills that have 
traditionally been thought to make people unique. There are fewer and fewer human 
abilities that make human beings superior to machines. What, then, is the locus of hu-
man agency? 
AI-regulated environments also modify the conditions of human intentionality. Un-
knowingly to the users, systems run by algorithms fix the available goals or set them in 
a preferential order. For example, recommender algorithms used by social media plat-
forms, music and movie streaming companies, online marketing agencies, and dating 
applications, collect user data such as previous online behavior and preferences and 
make recommendations or dictate what content users see [16]. Consequently, the users 
may cherish false expectations, pursue unachievable goals, or disinvest their time and 
energy, just because they are not fully aware of the algorithmic terms of the system.  
Such developments are often unintentional; it is not a part of the concept of AI to 
curb human agency but to enhance it. The effects of activities in AI-regulated environ-
ments are unpredictable, but they may have wide-ranging implications in terms of how 
we perceive ourselves and treat other humans as intentional agents. There is already 
psychological evidence that performing computer-assisted tasks weakens the experi-
ence of being fully in charge of one’s actions [2]. People show different personality 
traits when communicating with an AI than when interacting with another human [21]. 
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Cooperating with AI and robots may therefore deteriorate the conditions that accentuate 
the feeling of moral responsibility in human agents.  
Reliable, relevant, and wide-ranging information is important for any meaningful 
and responsible—and, in this sense, rational—decision-making process. Multinational 
giants such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter apply algorithms that have a huge impact 
on national and international politics and economies, as well as on ordinary people’s 
private lives [16]. The ways in which the systems direct and manage the flows of infor-
mation may remain a mystery even to their designers. There are already ample exam-
ples of how algorithms can be prejudiced in terms of the sources of available knowledge 
and how they can boost disinformation, thereby distorting the rational decision-making 
processes of human agents. 
As the above examples show, it is not difficult to find cases of AI-regulated envi-
ronments in which even the present use of AI technology impairs the conditions of 
human agency. It is, therefore, not exaggerating the risks to fear that such developments 
may weaken the terms on which our sense of human dignity and the institutions that 
support it rely. 
5 Conclusions  
There is already evidence of the effect that cooperation with AI systems has on humans’ 
perception of the conditions of their agency. Great expectations concerning the instru-
mental benefits of AI-enhanced activities and their economic value direct the develop-
ment of the AI industry. This may overshadow the implicit effects that living and work-
ing in various AI environments have on human agency and moral responsibility. 
Listing ethical principles for AI development and use is not enough; they are ab-
stract ideals, hard to apply in actual design and use. It is necessary, therefore, to ob-
tain a deeper understanding of how technological progress takes place and how it is 
intertwined with economic and political realities in different types of societies and in 
the global community.  
No matter how skillfully, diligently, and creatively AI systems can be designed to 
work, moral responsibility remains a human characteristic. It is therefore our duty to 
develop AI to serve morally good ends and purposes. Protecting and strengthening the 
conditions of human agency in any AI environment is part of this task.  
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